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Sowing Seeds Uncertain:  
Ocean Iron Fertilization, Climate Change, and 
the International Environmental Law 
Framework 
RANDALL S. ABATE* AND ANDREW B. GREENLEE** 
INTRODUCTION 
In a world plagued by the effects of climate change, ocean 
iron fertilization and other geoengineering techniques1 could help 
 
* Associate Professor of Law, Florida A & M University College of Law. 
** B.A., Emory University; M.A., University of Miami; J.D, Florida State 
University College of Law, 2010. During law school, Mr. Greenlee was a 
selection editor of the Journal of Transnational Law and Policy, a member of the 
Journal of Land Use and Environmental Law, and a member of the Florida 
State team that advanced to the semi-finals of the National Environmental 
Moot Court Competition in 2009. In May 2010, Mr. Greenlee will begin 
employment as a law clerk for the Honorable Judge Mary S. Scriven in the 
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.  
 1. Ocean iron fertilization is just one facet of a much larger debate on 
whether geoengineering—the use of technology to manipulate naturally 
occurring environmental processes—presents a viable means to combat global 
climate change. For an excellent overview of the potential of geoengineering 
techniques, see generally Alan Carlin, Global Climate Change Control: Is There 
a Better Strategy Than Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions?, 155 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1401 (2007). For an overview and analysis of geoengineering techniques 
discussed on the floor of the United States House of Representatives, see 
Geoengineering: Assessing the Implications of Large-Scale Climate 
Intervention: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Science and Technology, 111th 
Cong. (Nov. 5, 2009). For a review of geoengineering techniques that specifically 
involve the use of the ocean, see also Peter Liss, Professor, Univ. of E. Anglia 
Sch. of Envtl. Sci., Keynote Presentation at the International Ocean 
Stewardship Forum 2009: Geoengineering the Oceans: Miracle Cure or Snake 
Oil? (June 10, 2009), available at http://www.oceanstewardship.com/IOSF% 
202009/Keynotes_2009/ PLiss_2009.pdf. Professor Liss provides examples of 
geoengineering proposals such as: launching turbine-fitted vessels that would 
spray out a mist to whiten clouds; installing wave-driven upwelling systems to 
bring nutrient-rich cold water to the surface of the ocean; increasing ocean 
1
ABATE & GREENLEE  
556 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  27 
to respond and adapt to this global environmental crisis.  
Nevertheless, the international community, consistent with its 
reactions to other science-inspired responses to modern 
problems,2 has approached the promise of ocean iron fertilization 
with a half-hearted embrace and a surplus of healthy skepticism.3 
The controversy surrounding ocean iron fertilization reached 
a critical juncture in the past year.  On January 7, 2009, a team 
of researchers from Germany’s Alfred Wegener Institute for Polar 
and Marine Research and India’s National Institute of 
Oceanography embarked on an expedition to the Antarctic 
Peninsula to assess the potential of ocean iron fertilization as a 
new approach to address climate change.4  The LOHAFEX5 team 
 
alkalinity electrochemically; and enhancing the natural sulfur cycle to slow 
global warming. 
 2. For example, the potential risks posed by genetically modified food as a 
response to the global food shortage, and nuclear energy as a component of the 
response to the global energy crisis, have generated significant public outcry 
that continues to this day. See generally Katharine Van Tassel, Genetically 
Modified Food, Risk Assessment and Scientific Uncertainty Principles:  Does the 
New Understanding of the Networked Gene Trigger the Need for Post-Market 
Surveillance to Protect Public Health?, 15 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 220 (2009); 
Martin Peder Maarbjerg, The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership: Is the Cure 
Worse Than the Disease?, 16 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 127 (2009). 
 3. For background information on the controversy surrounding ocean iron 
fertilization, compare Jennie Dean, Iron Fertilization: A Scientific Review with 
International Policy Recommendations, 32 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 321 
(2009) (arguing further scientific research is not warranted because negative 
consequences outweigh sequestration potential and recommending outright 
ban), and Aaron Strong et al., Ocean Fertilization: Time to Move On, 461 
NATURE 347 (2009) (arguing iron fertilization is not an effective way to fight 
climate change and no further research is needed), with William Daniel Davis, 
What Does Going Green Mean?: Anthropogenic Climate Change, 
Geoengineering, and International Environmental Law, 43 GA. L. REV. 901 
(2009) (recognizing its potential as an “insurance policy against the risk of 
catastrophic climate change” and calling for the creation of a new United States 
agency to lead research efforts), and Kenneth Coale, Moss Landing Marine Lab., 
Address at the 2009 American Physical Society April Meeting: Recent Results 
from Iron Enrichment Experiments: Implications for Geoengineering (May 4, 
2009) (noting that natural iron inputs have had major impact on past climate 
changes and that the role of iron fertilization as a geoengineering solution to 
climate change can only be evaluated through experimental manipulations 
designed for that purpose). 
 4. Press Release, Alfred Wegener Inst., Background Information on the 
Project LOHAFEX as of 22 January 2009 (Jan. 22, 2009) (on file with author) 
[hereinafter AWI Background Information]; Press Release, Nat’l Inst. of 
Oceanography, India, LOHAFEX: An Indo-German Open Ocean Experiment to 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss2/5
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proposed to dump six tons of dissolved iron sulfate over 116 
square miles of ocean surface between 200 and 500 nautical miles 
north or northwest of South Georgia Island to induce rapid 
growth of a phytoplankton bloom.6  In theory, such blooms can 
absorb massive amounts of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere 
and subsequently fall to the ocean floor, creating a “carbon sink” 
that effectively sequesters carbon, offsets global emissions of 
carbon dioxide, and mitigates some of the impacts of global 
warming.7 
Despite its laudable intentions, the LOHAFEX ocean iron 
fertilization proposal drew significant opposition.  On January 13, 
2009, the German Environment Ministry requested that the 
German Research Ministry immediately halt the expedition.8  
The Environment Ministry raised concerns about the 
compatibility of the project with the decisions of the 9th Meeting 
of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD); the lack of an independent assessment into the 
potential environmental impacts of the experiment; and the 
adverse international response to the project by members of the 
media, who might view the project as a government-subsidized 
entrance into what could become a multi-billion dollar market.9  
The German Research Ministry responded to these concerns by 
temporarily halting the project.10 
Several days later, however, the German Environment 
Ministry reversed its course and decided to allow the project to 
 
Test the Effects of Iron Fertilization on the Ecology and Carbon Uptake 
Potential of the Southern Ocean (Jan. 12, 2009) (on file with author). 
 5. “LOHA” means iron in Hindi and “FEX” is shorthand for fertilization 
experiment.  Id. 
 6. AWI Background Information, supra note 4, at 2. 
 7. RAPHAEL SAGARIN ET AL., DUKE UNIV. NICHOLAS INST. FOR ENV’T 
POLICY SOLUTIONS, IRON FERTILIZATION IN THE OCEAN FOR CLIMATE 
MITIGATION: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES 3 (2007), 
http://www.nicholas.duke.edu/institute/ironfertilization.pdf. 
 8. Germany Blasts Geo-Engineering Scheme in Atlantic, TERRADAILY.COM, 
Jan. 14, 2009, http://www.terradaily.com/reports/Climate_Germany_blasts_geo-
engineering_scheme_in_Atlantic_999.html. 
 9. See Press Release, German Fed. Env’t Ministry, Federal Environment 
Ministry Regrets Approval by Federal Research Ministry of Iron Enrichment 
Experiment (Jan. 26, 2009) (on file with author). 
 10. Quirin Schiermeier, Ocean Fertilization: Dead in the Water?, 457 NATURE 
520 (2009), available at http://www.nature.com/news/2009/090128/pdf/457520b. 
pdf. 
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proceed.  Research Minister Annette Schavan declared that 
“[a]fter a study of expert reports, I am convinced there are no 
scientific or legal objections against the . . . ocean research 
experiment LOHAFEX.”11  Shortly thereafter, the German 
Environment Ministry issued a press release reiterating its 
objections and voicing its regret over the decision to allow the 
experiment to proceed.12 
Private enterprises proposing ocean iron fertilization 
experiments have also stirred controversy.  Planktos, a company 
based in the United States, announced plans to use similar 
technology to generate carbon credits that might be sold or 
traded.13  When warned by the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) that such research activities might 
violate the Ocean Dumping Ban Act of 1988,14 Planktos responded 
that its activities would no longer be conducted with a U.S.-
flagged vessel.15  Though Planktos later abandoned the project 
after failing to secure adequate funding, other commercial outfits 
such as Climos, which recently announced its plans to engage in 
iron fertilization of up to 40,000 square kilometers of ocean, are 
attempting to profit using a similar business model.16 
The dire threats posed by climate change have inspired 
innovative methods of carbon sequestration, including ocean iron 
fertilization as one of a variety of tools to mitigate the threat.17  
 
 11. German Coalition at Loggerheads Over Global Warming Test, 
SPACEDAILY.COM, Jan. 26, 2009, http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/German_ 
coalition_at_ loggerheads_over_global_warming_test_999.html. 
 12. Press Release, German Fed. Env’t Ministry, supra note 9. 
 13. SAGARIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 7-8. 
 14. Id. For information on the Act, see generally Ocean Dumping Ban Act of 
1988, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-45 (2006). 
 15. SAGARIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 7-8. 
 16. Richard Black, Setback for Climate Fix, BBC NEWS, Mar. 23, 2009, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/7959570.stm. For information on a 
company seeking to profit from fertilization techniques that use nitrogen instead 
of iron, see Ocean Nourishment Corporation, http://www.oceannourishment.com 
(last visited Apr. 14, 2010). 
 17. For a summary of climate change and the threats it poses, see 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, IPCC FOURTH ASSESSMENT 
REPORT, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT (2007), available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf. For a broad 
overview of the role of carbon cycle management as a means to mitigate climate 
change, see Lisa Dilling et al., The Role of Carbon Cycle Observations and 
Knowledge in Carbon Management, 28 ANN. REV. ENVTL. RES. 521-58 (2003). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss2/5
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However, there is little concrete data available about the 
environmental consequences of ocean iron fertilization or the 
efficacy of ocean iron fertilization as a method of carbon 
sequestration.18  Moreover, because ocean iron fertilization 
activities generally take place on the high seas, beyond the 
jurisdiction of domestic legal regimes, it is unclear which sources 
of international law should regulate the two categories of ocean 
iron fertilization projects: (1) the small-scale research activities 
that have taken place to date, and (2) the large-scale, and 
potentially more dangerous, ventures contemplated by private 
companies.19 
This article explores the promise and perils of ocean iron 
fertilization and the intricacies of its regulation under 
international environmental law.  Part I examines the science of 
ocean iron fertilization and its strengths and limitations as a 
strategy to mitigate climate change.  Part II reviews the 
overlapping international legal regimes that govern ocean 
fertilization—the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS),20 the CBD,21 and the London Convention and 
Protocol22—and the applicability of those regimes to ocean iron 
 
 18. Ken O. Buesseler et al., Ocean Iron Fertilization—Moving Forward in a 
Sea of Uncertainty, 319 SCIENCE 162 (2008), available at http://academics2.vmi. 
edu/biol/humstonr/GCC/Buesseler%20et%20al%202008.pdf. “Although these 
[twelve] experiments greatly improved our understanding of the role of iron in 
regulating ocean ecosystems and carbon dynamics, they were not designed to 
characterize OIF as a carbon mitigation strategy . . . [and] we do not understand 
the intended and unintended biogeochemical and ecological impacts.” Id.  
 19. For an international legal regime that distinguishes between small-scale 
and large-scale research activities, see Convention on Biological Diversity, June 
5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79 [hereinafter CBD]; see also Convention on Biological 
Diversity, COP 9 Decision IX/16, Biodiversity and Climate Change, http://www. 
cbd.int/decision/cop/?id=11659 (last visited Apr. 16, 2010). For a commercial 
enterprise proposing to use emerging environmental markets to help fund 
research on ocean iron fertilization and  fertilize up to 40,000 square kilometers 
of ocean, see What is Climos’ Funding/business Model?, http://www.climos.com/ 
faq.php#8 (last visited Apr. 16, 2010); Black, Setback for Climate Fix, supra note 
16. 
 20. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 
[hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
 21. CBD, supra note 19. 
 22. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes 
and Other Matter, Dec. 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403, 1046 U.N.T.S. 138 [hereinafter 
London Convention]; 1996 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of 
Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 1972, Nov. 7, 1996, 
S. TREATY DOC. NO. 110-5, 36 I.L.M. 1 [hereinafter London Protocol]. 
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fertilization projects.  Part III addresses the controversy and 
conflicting legal obligations at issue in the LOHAFEX project to 
illustrate the need for a new legal framework to govern ocean iron 
fertilization.  Part IV proposes a new international regulatory 
framework to govern ocean iron fertilization.  This framework 
would harmonize incongruous treaty obligations by bringing all 
classes of activity under UNCLOS with permitting and 
arbitration authority delegated to the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO).23  It would also seek to harness the capital 
and innovation of private enterprise by allowing those entities 
that can prove that their carbon sequestration efforts are effective 
and benign to conduct ocean iron fertilization projects and sell 
carbon credits. 
However, the framework would also require measures to 
protect the environment.  Any proposed experiment, regardless of 
the scale, would have to conduct a rigorous environmental 
assessment prior to approval.  In addition, the framework would 
require state sponsorship for any project and would distinguish 
between small-scale and large-scale projects, with the latter 
subject to more stringent permitting requirements, a higher 
degree of potential liability, and monitoring through on-board 
observers or satellite imaging.  This two-tiered regulatory 
approach would promote environmentally responsible 
experiments by private and public actors, thereby expanding the 
body of information available to policy makers seeking to 
evaluate ocean iron fertilization as a tool to mitigate global 
climate change.  It would also retain flexibility so that the 
international regulatory regime could respond quickly to any 
relevant scientific advancement. 
I.  THE SCIENCE OF OCEAN IRON FERTILIZATION 
Ocean iron fertilization involves adding iron to the sea to 
artificially stimulate the rapid growth of phytoplankton, whose 
 
 23. The International Maritime Organization (IMO), a specialized agency 
within the United Nations that maintains a comprehensive framework for 
shipping and its remit, already plays a significant role in the implementation of 
regulations pursuant to UNCLOS. For additional information on the interaction 
between UNCLOS and IMO, see generally Agustín Blanco-Bazán, IMO interface 
with the Law of the Sea Convention, IMO, Jan. 6-9, 2000, http://www.imo.org/ 
home.asp?topic_id=194 (scroll down to No. 2 to access). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss2/5
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photosynthetic activity could potentially absorb enough heat-
trapping carbon dioxide to help cool the atmosphere of the 
Earth.24  In practice, this strategy requires spreading iron 
particles in ocean areas where iron exists in such low 
concentrations that its absence limits phytoplankton growth.25  
These waters include the Southern Ocean and the equatorial and 
northern regions of the Pacific Ocean.26 
Proponents emphasize the vast potential of ocean iron 
fertilization as a way to rapidly deploy “carbon sinks” that could 
draw large amounts of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.27  The 
addition of relatively small amounts of iron offers the possibility 
of large increases in carbon sequestration and rapid mitigation of 
climate change at a relatively low financial cost.28  A pioneer of 
this method, the late John Martin, famously quipped, “[g]ive me 
half a tanker of iron, and I’ll give you an ice age.”29  Yet critics 
point to three major flaws with this strategy: (1) it may be less 
efficient than it seems;30 (2) it could raise a host of foreseeable 
and unforeseeable adverse environmental consequences;31 and (3) 
its effectiveness is difficult to measure.32  This part of the article 
examines the promise of this geoengineering technique as well as 
its pitfalls. 
 
 24. Buesseler et al., supra note 18. 
 25. SAGARIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 3-4. 
 26. Id. at 4. 
 27. See, e.g., V. Smetacek & S.W.A. Naqvi, The Next Generation of Iron 
Fertilization Experiments in the Southern Ocean, 366 PHIL. TRANS.R. SOC’Y A 
3947, 3947-67 (2008), available at http://rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/ 
366/1882/3947.full.pdf+html. Interestingly, Smetacek, who was one of the lead 
scientists on the LOHAFEX expedition, lost much of his enthusiasm for iron 
fertilization as a mitigation strategy following the modest results of that 
experiment, see Black, Setback for Climate Fix, supra note 16.   
 28. Ken O. Buesseler & Phillip W. Boyd, Will Ocean Fertilization Work?, 
300 SCIENCE 67 (2003).  
 29. Hugh Powell, Fertilizing the Ocean with Iron: Is this a Viable Way to 
Help Reduce Carbon Dioxide Levels in the Atmosphere?, 46 OCEANUS 4 (2008), 
available at http://www.whoi.edu/cms/files/OceanusIron_Fertilizing_ 30749.pdf. 
 30. See, e.g., Buesseler & Boyd, supra note 28. 
 31. See, e.g., ALLSOPP ET AL., GREENPEACE RESEARCH LAB., A SCIENTIFIC 
CRITIQUE OF OCEANIC IRON FERTILIZATION AS A CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION 
STRATEGY 3-4 (2007), available at http://www.greenpeace.to/publications/iron_ 
fertilisation_ critique.pdf. 
 32. See, e.g., id. at 13. 
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 A.  The Promise of the Iron Hypothesis 
The conceptual foundation for ocean iron fertilization traces 
its origins to a scientific article published in 1988.33  The author, 
John Martin, recognized that wind-swept atmospheric dust from 
land formed an important source of iron for ocean waters, and 
that iron-deficient regions of the ocean received minimal amounts 
of that dust.34  Martin also observed that there is an inverse 
correlation between ice core records of carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere and dust concentrations in the past 180,000 years: 
when atmospheric carbon dioxide was low, high concentrations of 
dust were present.35  Martin hypothesized that during dry glacial 
periods, a greater amount of iron reached then iron-deficient 
waters and activated a “biological pump” that absorbed carbon 
dioxide from the atmosphere and affected global climate 
patterns.36  This “iron hypothesis” generated a tremendous 
amount of interest in ocean iron fertilization. 
After Martin’s original findings, scientists have utilized ice-
core records to suggest that in past glacial periods natural ocean 
iron fertilization repeatedly absorbed as much as sixty-billion 
tons of carbon from the atmosphere.37  Early climate models 
likewise indicated that intentional iron fertilization could absorb 
between one to two billion tons of carbon from the air, which 
would offset ten to twenty-five percent of the world’s annual total 
emissions of carbon dioxide.38  Given that iron fertilization occurs 
naturally and has arguably withdrawn significant amounts of 
carbon dioxide from the atmosphere in the past, proponents 
assert that it could play a considerable role as a mitigation tool.39  
Some scientists and private companies have also claimed that 
ocean iron fertilization projects would have the secondary 
 
 33. John H. Martin & S.E. Fitzwater, Iron Deficiency Limits Phytoplankton 
Growth in the North-East Pacific Subarctic, 331 NATURE 341, 341-43 (1988). 
 34. John H. Martin, Glacial-Interglacial CO2 Change: The Iron Hypothesis, 5 
PALEOCEANOGRAPHY 1, 10 (1990). 
 35. Id. at 10. 
 36. Id. at 2. 
 37. Powell, Fertilizing the Ocean with Iron, supra note 29, at 4. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See Kenneth S. Johnson & David M. Karl, Is Ocean Fertilization Credible 
or Creditable?, 296 SCIENCE 467, 467-68 (2002). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss2/5
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advantage of stimulating the base of the food chain and 
promoting marine productivity.40 
To some degree, the thirteen open-water experiments that 
have taken place to date have verified the potential of ocean iron 
fertilization to draw carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.  In a 
review of the first twelve experiments, one study concluded that 
the results have “unequivocally shown that iron supply limits 
production in [more than one-third] of the global ocean, where 
surface macronutrient concentrations are perennially high.”41  
This finding demonstrates the vast expanse of water amenable to 
fertilization activities: in approximately one-third of the ocean, 
the only missing ingredient is iron.42  The initial twelve 
experiments also all reported up to fifteen-fold increases in 
surface-water chlorophyll content, a measure of carbon-drawing 
photosynthetic activity used in lieu of actual plankton counts.43  
The experiments all produced the predicted algae blooms, and one 
experiment demonstrated a twenty- to thirty-fold increase in 
phytoplankton biomass, a result that underscores the potential of 
this method to withdraw carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.44 
Perhaps the most important factor in the success of ocean 
iron fertilization projects is the location of such efforts.  The 
experiments up to this point have largely focused on high-
nutrient, low chlorophyll (HNLC) regions, such as the northern 
 
 40. Smetacek & Naqvi, supra note 27, at 1 (noting the possibility that 
increases in krill populations could lead to recovery of great whale populations); 
Ocean Nourishment Corporation, The Benefits, http://www.oceannourish 
ment.com/technology.asp (last visited Apr. 16, 2010) (claiming that “for every 
tonne of nitrogen infused into the ocean, 1.1 tonnes of fish (wet weight) may be 
produced”). 
 41. Nielsdottir et al., Iron Limitation of the Postbloom Phytoplankton 
Communities in the Iceland Basin, 23 GLOBAL BIOGEOCHEM. CYCLES 1, 12 (2009). 
 42. See id. 
 43. Hugh Powell, Will Ocean Fertilization Work?, 46 OCEANUS 10 (2008), 
available at http://www.whoi.edu/cms/files/OceanusIron_Will_It_Work_30747. 
pdf. 
 44. Sallie W. Chisholm et al., Dis-Crediting Ocean Fertilization, 294 SCIENCE 
309 (2001) (nevertheless, the author concludes that the environmental risks do 
not warrant commercial ocean iron fertilization activities). The most recent 
experiment, the LOHAFEX expedition, produced an algae bloom as expected, 
but one which did not last long and was less successful than anticipated in 
transporting carbon dioxide to the ocean floor, a problem examined more fully 
below, see infra notes 79-88 and accompanying text. For a helpful overview of 
the results of the LOHAFEX expedition, see Black, Setback for Climate Fix, 
supra note 16. 
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and equatorial Pacific Ocean and the Southern Ocean, because 
these areas already have high levels of other nutrients, such as 
nitrate, phosphate, and silicic acid, which are required for the 
growth of plankton present in the waters.45  The warmth of the 
equatorial waters promotes rapid plankton growth, but these 
regions already have some plankton growth.46  Consequently, 
some scientists have predicted that additional plankton would 
deplete the nutrient supply too quickly and produce blooms that 
are too concentrated to have more than a negligible effect on 
atmospheric carbon absorption.47 
The potential for fertilization is far greater in the Southern 
Ocean, which is due in part to the larger HNLC area of roughly 
twenty-million square miles.48  The waters of the area also 
contain far more nutrients than other iron-deficient areas.49  
Indeed, without the addition of iron, the nutrients of this region 
often sink to the bottom before they can be utilized.50  Some 
scientists have claimed that if the full expanse of these waters 
alone were artificially fertilized with iron, the ocean could remove 
one-eighth of the annual emissions from burning oil, gas, and 
coal.51 
In addition to these two principal regions for potential future 
ocean iron fertilization experiments, there are other areas that 
might support artificially induced phytoplankton growth.  
Anthony Michaels of the University of Southern California has 
investigated the possibility of fertilizing low-nutrient, low-
chlorophyll (LNLC) waters at the middle latitudes.52  One three-
week experiment in the North Atlantic showed that adding iron 
and phosphorus can stimulate the growth of the photosynthetic 
 
 45. Powell, Will Ocean Fertilization Work?, supra note 43, at 12. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Gerald Traufetter, Slowing Warming with Antarctic Iron, SPIEGEL 
ONLINE INTERNATIONAL, Jan. 2, 2009, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/ 
0,1518,599213,00.html. 
 49. Powell, Will Ocean Fertilization Work?, supra note 43, at 12. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Traufetter, supra note 48. 
 52. Powell, Will Ocean Fertilization Work?, supra note 43, at 12 (citing 
Anthony Michaels, Address at the Ocean Iron Fertilization Symposium: 
Nitrogen Fixation and Carbon Sequestration (Sept. 26, 2007) (on file with 
author)). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss2/5
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bacteria Trichodesmium.53  This species has the potential to 
convert dissolved nitrogen gas into a usable form and thereby 
produce blooms similar to the naturally occurring blooms found in 
HNLC regions.54  In addition, these blooms theoretically could 
add their own nutrients rather than deplete those nutrients from 
the surface water, a common criticism of HNLC iron 
experiments.55  However, these blooms have a tendency to deplete 
the phosphorus added to the water and die more quickly than 
HNLC blooms.56 
Another factor that plays a significant role in the success of 
carbon dioxide sequestration is the interplay between 
phytoplankton produced by the fertilization and the species that 
feed on them.  One study noted that the experiments that 
produced phytoplankton blooms containing larger diatom 
phytoplankton survive longer and, therefore, can draw more 
carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.57  This dynamic occurs 
because diatom phytoplankton has a protective silica casing that 
allows it to survive comparatively longer than other species of 
phytoplankton that do not have this casing.58  However, diatom 
phytoplankton tends to deplete the surrounding waters of the 
silica needed to form their casing, and the blooms tend to expire 
shortly thereafter.59  The lack of silica in the water was a limiting 
factor for the algal growth in the recent LOHAFEX experiment.60 
The type of creatures that feed on the blooms also matters 
with respect to the efficiency of carbon sequestration.  Scientists 
have suggested that the presence of salps, which excrete 
phytoplankton in heavier pellets, could lead to greater carbon 
 
 53. Id. For a robust scientific examination of LNLC fertilization and 
interesting hypothesis about efficacy of controlled upwelling techniques 
(pumping nutrient-rich deep water towards the surface), see David M. Karl & 
Ricardo M. Letelier, Nitrogen-Fixation Enhanced Carbon Sequestration in Low-
Nitrate, Low-Chlorophyll Seascapes, 364 MAR. ECOL. PROG. SER. 257 (2008). 
 54. Powell, Will Ocean Fertilization Work?, supra note 43, at 12. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Boyd et al., Mesoscale Iron Enrichment Experiments 1993-2005: 
Synthesis and Future Directions, 315 SCIENCE 612, 613, 615 ( 2007). 
 58. Black, Setback for Climate Fix, supra note 16. 
 59. Powell, Will Ocean Fertilization Work?, supra note 43, at 13. 
 60. Black, Setback for Climate Fix, supra note 16. 
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dioxide export efficiency.61  These heavier excretions make it more 
likely that the carbon dioxide withdrawn from the atmosphere 
will actually make it to the ocean floor, instead of returning to the 
surface and thereafter reintroducing the carbon dioxide into the 
atmosphere.62 
 B.  The Potential Pitfalls of Ocean Iron Fertilization 
Human intervention in any ecological system can trigger a 
chain reaction of foreseeable and unforeseeable consequences, the 
results of which are complex and difficult to monitor.  Ocean iron 
fertilization is no different.  Therefore, although ocean iron 
fertilization has the potential to serve as a potent tool in 
combating climate change, opponents have raised concerns about 
the potentially devastating ecological and geophysical impacts of 
this climate change mitigation strategy.63  While conceding that 
the addition of iron would draw carbon dioxide from the 
atmosphere, other critics do not believe that enough of this 
carbon would actually make it to the ocean floor to justify such 
potentially damaging measures.64 
Perhaps the most common criticism lodged against ocean iron 
fertilization is that it would, by design, significantly change the 
composition of the phytoplankton community.65  Studies 
undertaken on artificial and natural blooms have revealed 
dramatic changes in the species that make up the two lowest 
links in the marine food chain: phytoplankton and the bacteria 
that feed on them.66  Larger diatom phytoplankton generally 
 
 61. R. Perissinotto & E.A. Pakhomov, Contribution of Salps to Carbon Flux of 
Marginal Ice Zone of the Lazarev Sea, Southern Ocean, 131 MAR. BIOL.  25, 29 
(1998). 
 62. Id. 
 63. See, e.g., ALLSOPP ET AL., supra note 31. 
 64. See, e.g., Chisolm et al., supra note 44. 
 65. Id. at 310. 
 66. Hugh Powell, What are the Potential Side Effects?: The Uncertainties 
and Unintended Consequences of Manipulating Ecosystems, 46 OCEANUS 14 
(2008), available at http://www.whoi.edu/cms/files/OceanusIron_SideEffects_ 
30748.pdf (citing Phillip Boyd, New Zealand Nat’l Inst. for Water, Presentation 
at the Ocean Iron Fertilization Symposium: What Have We Learned From Past 
Iron Fertilization Experiments? (Sept. 26, 2007) and Stéphane Blain, 
CNRS/Université de la Méditerranée, Presentation at the Ocean Iron 
Fertilization Symposium: What Can We Learn From Natural Iron Sources? 
(Sept. 27, 2007)). 
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appear to benefit most from the iron enrichment,67 and scientists 
fear that disruption caused by such changes to the base of the 
food chain may affect populations of larger predators such as 
copepods, krill, salps, jellyfish, and other fish.68 
Many experts also have expressed concern that large-scale 
ocean iron fertilization projects could lead to detrimental 
reductions of essential nutrients down-current from the bloom.69  
Scientists know that phytoplankton blooms tend to decrease 
nutrients such as nitrate, phosphorus, and silicate concentrations 
located forty to fifty meters from the surface of the ocean.70  Thus, 
those down-current organisms that depend on these nutrients 
could suffer adverse impacts, which might result in reduced 
productivity of marine life and unpredictable changes in the 
structure of the marine food web.  Modeling has also shown that 
ocean iron fertilization could result in a long-term reduction in 
marine life productivity in much larger areas of the ocean.71 
Scientists have raised additional concerns that large-scale 
ocean iron fertilization projects could reduce oxygen levels in 
deeper waters.72  When a plankton bloom begins to die, the 
organic material sinks to deeper waters, and the decomposition 
that happens at this point depletes the natural oxygen in the 
water.73  This acute oxygen shortage has the potential to cause 
significant negative impacts on marine life including fish, 
shellfish, and invertebrates.74  While not directly attributable to 
iron fertilization, scientists have linked such outcomes to “toxic” 
 
 67. Hein J. W. De Baar et al., Synthesis of Iron Fertilization Experiments: 
From the Iron Age in the Age of Enlightenment, 110 J. GEOPHYSICAL RES. 2, 17 
(2005). 
 68. Powell, What are the Potential Side Effects?, supra note 66, at 14 (citing 
Stéphane Blain, CNRS/Université de la Méditerranée, Presentation at the 
Ocean Iron Fertilization Symposium (Sept. 26-27, 2007) and ALLSOPP ET AL., 
supra note 31, at 3). 
 69. See, e.g., ALLSOPP ET AL., supra note 31, at 3. 
 70. Buesseler et al., The Effects of Iron Fertilization on Carbon Sequestration 
in the Southern Ocean, 304 SCIENCE 414 (2004); Kenneth H. Coale et al., 
Southern Ocean Iron Enrichment Experiment: Carbon Cycling in High-and 
Low-Si Waters, 304 SCIENCE 408, 413 (2004). 
 71. ALLSOPP ET AL., supra note 31, at 10 (citing Anand Gnanadesikan et al., 
Effects of Patchy Ocean Fertilization on Atmospheric Biological Production, 17 
GLOBAL BIOGEOCHEM. CYCLES 19.1 (2003)). 
 72. ALLSOPP ET AL., supra note 31, at 10. 
 73. Powell, What are the Potential Side Effects?, supra note 66, at 14-15. 
 74. Id. at 15. 
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algal blooms off the coast of Oregon75 and in the Gulf of Mexico.76  
In studies conducted off the West Florida coast, these harmful 
blooms, also known as “red tides,” were linked to iron supplied by 
wind-blown dust from the Sahara and to localized phosphorus 
input.77  While no ocean iron fertilization study has yet linked the 
addition of iron to the creation of toxic blooms, many worry that 
large-scale projects run the risk of creating massive red tides. 
In a related concern, recent scientific research suggests that 
the cultivation of iron-enhanced diatom communities of the 
Pseudonitzschia genus could have damaging unintended 
consequences to surface-dwelling organisms.78  Coastal species of 
Pseudonitzschia have been known to produce the potent 
neurotoxin domoic acid, which has led to massive toxic harmful 
algal blooms in coastal waters.79  According to one scientist, 
domoic acid poisoning is becoming a regular occurrence in some 
parts of the world, leading to mass mortality and seizures in sea 
lions off the west coast of the United States.80  The recent 
research has linked oceanic varieties of Pseudonitzschia, 
previously perceived to be nontoxic, with the production of domoic 
acid.81  The findings demonstrate that toxin production can occur 
with ocean iron fertilization and indicates that large-scale 
fertilization projects could produce ecologically harmful levels of 
domoic acid.82 
Scientists also fear potentially damaging geophysical 
impacts.  The most troubling of these is the possibility of 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. ALLSOPP ET AL., supra note 31, at 11-12 (citing J.J. Walsh et al., Red Tides 
in the Gulf of Mexico: Where, When, and Why?, 11 J. GEOPHYSICAL RES. 111 
(2006) and NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., AFRICAN DUST LEADS TO LARGE 
TOXIC ALGAL BLOOM (2001), http://eospso.gsfc.nasa.gov/ftp_docs/African_Dust. 
pdf). 
 77. Id. 
 78. CHARLES G. TRICK ET AL., PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., IRON 
ENRICHMENT STIMULATES TOXIC DIATOM PRODUCTION IN HIGH-NITRATE, LOW-
CHLOROPHYLL AREAS 1 (2010), http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2010/02/24/ 
0910579107.full.pdf+html?sid=86200a60-9c23-4339-9c6c-a174d7aa8ffe. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Richard Black, Toxic Troubles for Climate ‘Fix’, BBC NEWS, Mar. 16, 
2010, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/science/nature/8569351.stm 
(quoting Ailsa Hall, Deputy Dir., Sea Mammal Research Inst. at St. Andrews 
Univ. Scotland). 
 81. TRICK ET AL., supra note 78, at 1. 
 82. Id. 
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increased production of nitrous oxide and methane, both far more 
potent greenhouse gases than carbon dioxide.83  Phytoplankton 
requires certain nutrients to grow.  After they die, the nutrients 
in their remains are believed to move into deeper waters many 
miles away from the site of the original iron fertilization.84  “The 
depletion of oxygen in these waters that has been attributed to 
algae blooms, coupled with the breakdown of inorganic nitrogen 
when organic matter is remineralized in the interior of the ocean, 
has the potential to produce nitrous oxide and methane.”85  One 
ocean iron fertilization experiment detected a small increase in 
nitrous oxide at the bottom of a mixed layer, and computer 
modeling predicted releases of nitrous oxide and methane that 
could more than counteract any benefits of carbon 
sequestration.86 
Another troubling geophysical outcome is the potential for 
the release of dimethylsulfide (DMS), a gas capable of producing 
clouds which could have an unpredictable impact on the climate.87  
Some classes of phytoplankton produce dimethylsulphonio-
propionate (DMSP), which degrades to DMS; thereby causing 
some scientists to fear that the resulting increase in DMS could 
increase the amount of clouds in the atmosphere and thus cool 
the planet in a highly unpredictable manner.88  Interestingly, 
others cite this outcome as a potential benefit of ocean iron 
fertilization.89 
Apart from these ecological and geophysical concerns, the 
experiments conducted thus far have not conclusively shown how 
 
 83. ALLSOPP ET AL., supra note 31, at 12; Powell, What are the Potential Side 
Effects?, supra note 66, at 4. 
 84. Id. 
 85. ALLSOPP ET AL., supra note 31, at 12. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Peter Liss et al., Ocean Fertilization with Iron: Effects on Climate and 
Air Quality, 57B TELLUS 269 (2005). 
 88. ALLSOPP ET AL., supra note 31, at 4; see also Liss et al., supra note 87, at 
270. 
 89. Liss et al., supra note 87, at 270 (noting that the authors stop short of 
endorsing iron fertilization, however, due to concerns about uncertainties that 
inhere in the technique and the potential countervailing effects of other gaseous 
bi-products such as nitrous oxide); see also Wingenter et al., Changing 
Concentrations of CO, CH4, C5H8, CH3Br, CH3I, and Dimethyl Sulfide During 
the Southern Ocean Iron Enrichment Experiments, 101 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 
8537, 8540 (2004). 
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much carbon actually gets transferred to the ocean floor or 
sufficiently deep waters.  To assess whether ocean iron 
fertilization has potential as an effective carbon sequestration 
method, it is necessary to compare the ratio of iron added to the 
amount of carbon sequestered.90  Laboratory experiments have 
shown comparatively high carbon export ratios, and proponents 
have used extrapolations from this data to support iron 
fertilization as a potential sequestration strategy.91  Scientists 
have not yet replicated these results in experiments in the ocean, 
however. 
The four open-ocean experiments that have taken place in 
the Southern Ocean—the most promising location for iron 
fertilization—have shown notable increases in biomass and 
promising decreases in inorganic carbon.92  However, the 
experiments provided limited evidence of sinking particles of the 
particulate organic carbon required for successful sequestration, 
which implies that carbon export efficiency might be far less than 
suggested by proponents when applied in actual ocean 
conditions.93  In summarizing the data collected in the first three 
experiments, Hugh Powell estimated that only five to fifty 
percent of the total carbon reaches 100 meters; about two to 
twenty percent sinks between 100 to 500 meters; and perhaps 
only one to fifteen percent of the original carbon falls below 500 
meters.94  The recent LOHAFEX experiment provided even less 
promising results, as increasing grazing pressure of small 
crustacean zooplankton prevented sustained growth of the 
phytoplankton bloom and limited carbon export to only “minor” 
amounts as compared to prior experiments.95 
Leading scientists caution against drawing conclusions from 
this data, however, because the ocean iron fertilization 
experiments have not yet been conducted over sufficiently long 
 
 90. Buesseler & Boyd, supra note 28. 
 91. Id. at 68 (concluding that, in light of the natural history of carbon 
absorption and subsequent tests, “exploring regulation of the ocean’s biological 
pump by iron supply is strongly warranted.”). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Powell, Will Ocean Fertilization Work?, supra note 43, at 10. 
 94. Id. at 11. 
 95. Press Release, Alfred Wegener Inst., Lohafex Provides New Insights on 
Plankton Ecology—Only Small Amounts of Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide Fixed 
(Mar. 23, 2009). 
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periods to observe the termination of the blooms in the Southern 
Ocean.96  They further note that large-scale or long-term 
experiments might come closer to approximating past climatic 
shifts towards lower atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations 
associated with iron dust influx, as evidenced in ice records.97  
Indeed, a recent study conducted on a natural phytoplankton 
bloom over the Kerguelen plateau in the Southern Ocean that 
was sustained by natural sources of iron and nutrients in surface 
waters showed carbon sequestration efficiency between 10 and 
150 times greater than in artificial fertilization experiments.98  
Though the bloom was sustained by continuous input of major 
nutrients other than iron and resulted from an upwelling of 
nutrients rather than input from below,99 it could be argued that 
methods of enrichment need only mirror more closely such 
natural processes to provide for effective and efficient carbon 
sequestration. 
A final concern regarding the prospect of ocean iron 
fertilization is the difficulty in monitoring the carbon 
sequestration.  To enable trading of carbon credits or selling of 
carbon offsets, independent organizations would have to be able 
to verify the amount of carbon exported to the ocean floor.  Critics 
have argued that a monitoring program of large-scale 
experiments would not work because the costs associated with 
tracing and verifying the amount of carbon sequestered, along 
with the monitoring of negative impacts such as nitrous oxide 
formation, de-oxygenation, or other ecological changes, would be 
prohibitively expensive.100 
Therefore, the promise of ocean iron fertilization as a climate 
change mitigation tool is tempered by a range of biological and 
geophysical concerns.  Nevertheless, the potential for this 
mitigation strategy to help combat climate change merits further 
research and requires a flexible legal framework that 
acknowledges the limitations of the current state of the science 
 
 96. Buesseler & Boyd, supra note 28, at 68. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Stéphane Blain et al., Distribution of Dissolved Iron During the Natural 
Iron-Fertilization Experiment KEOPS (Kerguelen Plateau, Southern Ocean), 55 
DEEP SEA RES. II 594 (2008). 
 99. Id. 
 100. See, e.g., ALLSOPP ET AL., supra note 31, at 13. 
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and reconciles the applicability of intersecting sources of 
international environmental law. 
II. THE EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
A regulatory framework for ocean iron fertilization requires 
the use of international law because the vast majority of waters 
best suited for ocean iron fertilization are located in the high 
seas, beyond the 200-mile jurisdictional boundaries of any coastal 
nation’s exclusive economic zone.101  Three international 
environmental law treaties govern ocean iron fertilization: (1) 
UNCLOS;102 (2) the CBD;103 and (3) the London Convention and 
Protocol.104  This part of the article addresses the legality of ocean 
iron fertilization under each of these treaties and considers the 
initial responses under these treaties to the legal challenges that 
ocean iron fertilization has presented. 
 A. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
UNCLOS provides the basic legal framework for both the 
protection of the world’s oceans and the use of the resources 
contained therein.105  UNCLOS is widely regarded as “the 
constitution for ocean governance.”106  Its provisions codify the 
customary international law obligation binding on all states, 
including non-party nations such as the United States, to prevent 
 
 101. Hugh Powell, Dumping Iron and Trading Carbon: Profits, Pollution, and 
Politics will Play Roles in Ocean Iron Fertilization, 46 OCEANUS 22 (2008). 
 102. UNCLOS, supra note 20. 
 103. CBD, supra note 19. 
 104. London Protocol, supra note 22. The Protocol entered into force on March 
24, 2006 and there are currently thirty seven parties to the Protocol. Although 
iron fertilization that takes place in the Southern Ocean might also have to 
comply with the strict laws designed to protect Antarctica, such as the Antarctic 
Treaty of 1959, its 1991 Madrid Environmental Protocol, and the 1980 
Convention for the Conservation of Antarctica, this paper seeks to provide a 
flexible global framework and analysis of these regional treaties is therefore 
beyond its scope. 
 105. David Freestone & Rosemary Rayfuse, Ocean Iron Fertilization and 
International Law, 364 MAR. ECOL. PROG. SER. 227, 228 (2008). 
 106. DAVID HUNTER, JAMES SALZMAN & DURWOOD ZAELKE, INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 739 (3d ed. 2007). 
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practices that damage the marine environment of other nations 
or areas beyond national jurisdiction.107 
UNCLOS Article 192 expresses the broad general obligation 
of all states “to protect and preserve the marine environment.”108  
Likewise, Article 145 provides in principle that “necessary 
measures shall be taken  . . . with respect to activities in the Area 
to ensure effective protection for the marine environment from 
harmful effects which may arise from such activities.”109  While 
these broad obligations are qualified somewhat by provisions that 
allow parties the sovereign right to exploit the natural resources 
in areas within their territorial control,110 states are nevertheless 
required to take all necessary measures to: (1) prevent, reduce 
and control pollution of the marine environment,111 (2) prohibit 
the transfer of damage or hazards from one area to another,112 
and (3) protect rare and fragile ecosystems, as well as the habitat 
of depleted, threatened, or endangered species from pollution.113 
Under Article 1(1)(4), UNCLOS defines pollution as: 
[T]he introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of 
substances or energy into the marine environment . . . 
which results or is likely to result in such deleterious 
effects as harm to living resources and marine life, hazards 
to human health, hindrance to marine activities, including 
fishing and other legitimate uses of the sea, impairment of 
quality for use of sea water and reduction of amenities.114 
Under this definition, it is not the nature of the substance 
introduced into the environment that brings an activity within its 
prohibitions, but the potential deleterious effects that its 
introduction may have.115  Proponents of ocean iron fertilization 
might argue that this definition of pollution would not cover their 
activities because such activity has not “resulted” nor is it “likely 
 
 107. Freestone & Rayfuse, supra note 105, at 228. 
 108. UNCLOS, supra note 20, art. 192. 
 109. Id. art. 145. 
 110. Id. art. 193. 
 111. Id. art. 194. 
 112. Id. art. 195. 
 113. Id. art. 194(5). 
 114. UNCLOS, supra note 20, art. 1(1)(4). 
 115. Freestone & Rayfuse, supra note 105, at 229. 
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to result” in the deleterious effects proscribed because this same 
result occurs naturally and the dire results predicted by some are 
largely based on modeling that operates under the assumption of 
worst case scenarios.116  Alternatively, proponents may argue that 
ocean iron enrichment could have a net positive effect because the 
phytoplankton blooms stimulate the base of the food chain.117 
One way for critics to respond to this line of argument, which 
emphasizes the uncertainty surrounding ocean iron fertilization, 
is to invoke the precautionary principle.  The precautionary 
principle provides that “where there are threats of serious or 
irreversible damage, lack of scientific certainty shall not be used 
as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation.”118  A corollary to this principle is 
that the burden of proof falls on those who propose to engage in 
activity that may harm the environment.119 
Unlike the majority of modern environmental legal and 
regional seas agreements,120 however, UNCLOS does not contain 
an express endorsement of the precautionary principle.121  
However, some scholars have read the pollution provisions of 
UNCLOS to contain an implicit endorsement of the precautionary 
principle because the definition of pollution refers to actions that 
“result or are likely to result” in the proscribed deleterious 
effects.122  Under this reading, the obligations to prevent pollution 
 
 116. See Smetacek & Naqvi, supra note 27, at 1. 
 117. Id. (noting the possibility that increases in krill populations could lead to 
recovery of great whale populations); Ocean Nourishment Corporation, The 
Benefits, http://www.oceannourishment.com/technology.asp (last visited Apr. 16, 
2010) (claiming that “for every tonne of nitrogen infused into the ocean, 1.1 
tonnes of fish (wet weight) may be produced.”). 
 118. The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Princ. 15, U.N. 
Doc A/CONF/151/26 (vol.1) (June 13, 1992), available at http://www.unep.org/ 
Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=78&articleid=1163. 
 119. David Kriebel et al., The Precautionary Principle in Environmental 
Science, 109 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECT. 871 (2001). 
 120. U.N. Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks, July 24-Aug. 4, 1995, Agreement for the Implementation of the 
Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 
December 1992 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling 
Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, art. 6, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.164/37 
(Sept. 8, 1995). 
 121. Karen Scott, The Day After Tomorrow: Ocean CO2 Sequestration and the 
Future of Climate Change, 18 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 57, 69 (2005). 
 122. Id. 
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are triggered even when no direct causal link has been 
established, so long as environmental harm is likely.123  Even 
assuming that the probability of harm does not rise to the level of 
likelihood, the party advocating the action should nevertheless 
bear the burden of proof that the action is benign. 
The problem with the precautionary principle in this context, 
however, is that the action proposed seeks to address the 
catastrophic environmental consequences of inaction in the face 
of climate change.  In other words, when the threat of 
environmental degradation posed by mitigation measures such as 
ocean iron fertilization is considered in the context of the more 
significant threat of large-scale environmental degradation from 
global warming, concerns regarding the risks of ocean iron 
fertilization become less compelling.  Advocates for ocean iron 
fertilization could argue that this climate change mitigation 
strategy is a cost-effective measure that could prevent the serious 
and irreversible environmental damage caused by climate 
change, and that lack of scientific certainty should not prevent its 
evaluation as a potentially critical mitigation tool.  This inversion 
of the logic of the precautionary principle, along with the absence 
of the principle in the language of UNCLOS, diminishes the 
applicability of the precautionary principle in the ocean iron 
fertilization context. 
There is, however, another way to bring ocean iron 
fertilization activities within the regulatory ambit of UNCLOS.  
Article 194 provides that states must act to prevent, reduce, and 
control pollution from all sources, which includes “dumping.”124  
Dumping is defined as “any deliberate disposal of wastes or other 
matter from vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made 
structures at sea.”125  Article 210 of UNCLOS requires states to 
adopt laws and regulations to prevent and regulate dumping that 
must be no less effective than internationally agreed global rules 
and standards.126  UNCLOS delegates the promulgation of global 
rules and standards regarding “dumping” to other international 
treaties, and endorses the recently enacted rules and standards 
under the CBD and the London Protocol, which specifically 
 
 123. Id. 
 124. UNCLOS, supra note 20, art. 194(3)(a). 
 125. Id. art. 1, para. 1(5)(a). 
 126. Id. art. 210(1-6). 
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address iron fertilization on the high seas.  It is to these two 
treaty regimes that the analysis now turns. 
 B. The Convention on Biological Diversity 
The 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) seeks to 
conserve biodiversity and encourage the sustainable use of its 
components, including genetic resources.127  The protection of 
marine and coastal areas within the framework of the CBD 
emerged as an important agenda item in the mid-1990s following 
the conclusion of the Jakarta Mandate in 1995 and the adoption 
of a program of related works in 1998.128 
Parties to the CBD directly addressed ocean iron fertilization 
at the May 2008 Ninth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties 
in Bonn.  Section C of Decision IX/16 urged States to use the 
utmost caution when considering proposals for large-scale ocean 
iron fertilization and declared that such large-scale operations 
were not justified.129  Decision IX/16 further recommended that 
parties and governments act in accordance with the 
precautionary principle to ensure that ocean iron fertilization 
activities do not take place until there is: (1) an adequate 
scientific basis on which to justify such activities, including 
assessing associated risks; and a (2) global, transparent, and 
effective regulatory mechanism for these activities.130 
Decision IX/16 established an exception for “small-scale” 
scientific research studies undertaken within “coastal waters.”131  
It qualified the exception by authorizing only those experiments 
justified by the need to gather specific scientific data, provided 
 
 127. CBD, supra note 19, art. 1. 
 128. See id. See also Scott, supra note 121, at 105; 4th Meeting of the 
Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Decision 
IV/5 (May 1998). At the Fourth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties in 1998, 
the parties adopted Decision IV/5, which contained a program of work arising 
from the Jakarta Mandate on Marine and Coastal Biological Diversity. The 
program of work, contained in the annex to the decision, identified five “key 
elements” that required further attention:  (1) integrated marine and coastal 
area management, (2) marine and coastal living resources, (3) marine and 
coastal protected areas, (4) mariculture, and (5) alien species and genotypes. 
 129. 9th Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, Decision IX/16, Section C (May 2008). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
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that the studies were subject to a thorough prior assessment of 
the potential impacts of the research studies on the marine 
environment.132  Finally, Decision IX/16 distinguished between 
research conducted for scientific purposes and research conducted 
for generating and selling carbon offsets or any other commercial 
purposes, and forbade ocean iron fertilization activities designed 
to promote research in the latter category.133 
Interpreting the effect of Decision IX/16 has raised some 
important questions.  First, Decision IX/16 fails to define “small-
scale” activities that would fit within the scientific research 
exception of the framework.  When compared to the vast expanse 
of the oceans, one thousand square miles might be considered to 
be “small scale.”  Yet such an experiment would far exceed the 
scope of any experiments yet undertaken.  Second, Decision IX/16 
calls for the restriction of research activities to “coastal waters.”  
Yet this limitation deprives scientists of the most useful regions 
for experimentation – the iron-deficient high seas of the Southern 
Ocean.  This language was likely included in an attempt to 
internalize the externalities perceived to be present on the high 
seas.134  However, Decision IX/16 essentially imposes a 
moratorium on ocean iron fertilization experiments, particularly 
since the international system has not yet framed a global, 
transparent, and effective regulatory mechanism as required 
under this CBD decision. 
 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. If the high seas are common property, available for anyone to exploit, 
then economic theory indicates that the high seas could suffer from a tragedy of 
the commons and the externality of over-exploitation. See, e.g., Bernard H. 
Oxman, The Territorial Temptation: A Siren Song at Sea, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 
830, 833 (2006) (discussing the failure of the 1958 Convention on Fishing and 
Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas to provide an effective 
means for avoiding the tragedy of the commons). A response to this problem was 
for coastal states to claim to control the sea out to 200 miles. One way to avoid 
this problem in the ocean iron fertilization context would be to restrict any 
operations to coastal waters, where countries have an interest in protecting the 
resources within their jurisdiction. This approach eliminates the externality by 
making those coastal countries internalize the environmental costs associated 
with ocean iron fertilization. 
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 C. The London Convention and Protocol 
Both the 1972 London Convention on the Prevention of 
Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter135 and 
its more recent incarnation, the 1996 London Protocol, provide 
rules and standards that pertain generally to marine pollution 
and, more specifically, to ocean iron fertilization.  Parties to the 
London Convention cannot dump any prohibited substances 
without first undergoing an environmental impact assessment, 
obtaining a permit, and complying with the monitoring 
requirements of Annex 2 of the London Protocol.136 
By contrast, under the stricter London Protocol, dumping of 
any waste or other matter is prohibited, except for five categories 
of substances listed in Annex 1.137  Parties to the London Protocol 
must additionally abide by the precautionary principle under 
Article 3 of the Protocol.  Article 3 requires the adoption of 
“appropriate preventative measures” whenever an activity is 
“likely to cause harm” even when there is “no conclusive evidence 
to prove a causal relation between inputs and their effects.”138  
However, both the London Convention139 and the London 
Protocol140 provide an exception to these restrictions whereby the 
“placement of matter for a purpose other than the mere disposal 
thereof does not qualify as dumping,” provided that such 
placement is not contrary to the aims of the Convention or 
Protocol.141 
On May 8, 2007, the Scientific Group of the London 
Convention and the Scientific Group of the London Protocol 
 
 135. See London Convention, supra note 22. The Convention, which entered 
into force in 1975, has provided a framework for international control and 
prevention of marine pollution. A special meeting of the Contracting Parties 
produced the "1996 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine 
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 1972," which was designed 
to replace the 1972 Convention. For an overview of recent developments 
respecting these two instruments, see generally Alan B. Sielen, The New 
International Rules on Ocean Dumping: Promise and Performance, 21 GEO. 
INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 495 (2009). 
 136. Freestone & Rayfuse, supra note 105, at 229. 
 137. Id. 
 138. London Protocol, supra note 22, art. 3. 
 139. London Convention, supra note 22, art. 3(b)(ii). 
 140. London Protocol, supra note 22, at 1.4.2.2. 
 141. London Convention, supra note 22; London Protocol, supra note 22, at 
1.4.2.2. 
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released a joint Statement of Concern about Ocean 
Fertilization.142  This document stated that the current knowledge 
about the practice was insufficient to justify large-scale projects 
and characterized iron fertilization as largely a speculative 
endeavor.143  It also noted the risk of negative impacts that large-
scale projects posed to the marine environment.  Ultimately, the 
joint statement recommended that any operations be carefully 
evaluated to ensure that activities were not contrary to the aims 
of the London Convention and the London Protocol.144 
The parties to the London Convention and Protocol revisited 
this topic in London in October 2008 and agreed to adopt Annex 
Six Resolution LC-LP.1 on the Regulation of Ocean Fertilization 
(Annex Six Resolution).145  This resolution stated that the scope of 
the London Convention and Protocol includes ocean iron 
fertilization activities, which it defined as any activity 
undertaken by humans with the principal intention of 
stimulating primary productivity in the oceans.146  The resolution 
further stated that “legitimate scientific research” should be 
regarded as “placement of matter for a purpose other than mere 
disposal” under both the London Convention and the London 
Protocol.147  As such, this resolution exempted from the 
prohibitions of both treaties ocean iron fertilization projects that 
qualify as “legitimate scientific research.” 
The Annex Six Resolution does not specify what activities 
constitute “legitimate scientific research.”  The resolution merely 
provides that proposals should be assessed on a case-by-case 
basis using an assessment framework to be developed by the 
Scientific Groups under the London Convention and Protocol, 
which should include tools for determining whether the proposed 
 
 142. See SCI. GROUP OF THE LONDON PROTOCOL & SCI. GROUP OF THE LONDON 
CONVENTION, STATEMENT OF CONCERN REGARDING IRON FERTILIZATION OF THE 
OCEANS TO SEQUESTER CO2 (2007), available at http://www.whoi.edu/cms/files/ 
London_Convention_statement_24743_29324.pdf. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. See ANNEX SIX RESOLUTION LC-LP.1 ON THE REGULATION OF OCEAN 
FERTILIZATION,http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D2433
7/LC-LP1(30).pdf [hereinafter ANNEX SIX RESOLUTION]; London Protocol, supra 
note 22; London Convention, supra note 22. 
 146. ANNEX SIX RESOLUTION, supra note 145. 
 147. Id. 
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activity is contrary to the aims of the Convention and Protocol.148  
Until such guidance is available, the resolution urges contracting 
parties to use utmost caution and the “best available guidance”149 
to evaluate whether the proposal will ensure protection of the 
marine environment consistent with the Convention and 
Protocol.150  Finally, the resolution expressly forbids any ocean 
iron fertilization activities other than legitimate scientific 
research and states that such projects cannot qualify for any 
exemption from the definition of dumping. 
The Intersessional Technical Working Group on Ocean 
Fertilization had its first meeting from February 9-13, 2009 
under the Chairmanship of Dr. Chris Vivian.151  Delegations from 
eighteen Contracting Parties to the London Convention attended, 
as did delegations from fifteen members of the Contracting 
Parties to the London Protocol.152  Several non-governmental 
organizations, including Greenpeace International, as well as an 
intergovernmental organization, the North Pacific Marine 
Science Organization, also attended the meeting.153  The group 
convened to develop an assessment framework on ocean 
fertilization and compile information for the contracting parties 
on ocean iron fertilization and its impacts on the marine 
environment.154 
 
 148. Id. 
 149. The resolution directs parties to consult the following sources for 
guidance:  (1) previous agreements of the Consultative Meetings/Meetings of the 
Contracting Parties; (2) Annex III of the London Convention; (3) Annex 2 of the 
London Protocol; (4) the considerations for evaluating ocean fertilization 
proposals developed by the scientific groups; and (5) the Revised Generic Waste 
Assessment Guidance. Id. n.4. 
 150. IMO, FIRST MEETING OF THE INTERSESSIONAL TECHNICAL WORKING 
GROUP ON OCEAN FERTILIZATION, PROVISIONAL AGENDA (2009), available at 
http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D24375/1.pdf  
(in December 2008, the IMO announced the First Meeting of the Intersessional 
Technical Working Group on Ocean Fertilization to take place February 9-13, 
2009).  The Agenda calls for the “[d]evelopment of an assessment framework on 
ocean fertilization.”  Id. 
 151. IMO, INTERSESSIONAL TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP ON OCEAN 
FERTILIZATION, REPORT OF THE FIRST MEETING OF THE INTERSESSIONAL TECHNICAL 
WORKING GROUP ON OCEAN FERTILIZATION § 1.1 (2009), [hereinafter IMO 
REPORT], available at http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3 
D25080/5.pdf. 
 152. Id. §§ 1.2, 1.3. 
 153. Id. §§ 1.6, 1.7. 
 154. Id. §§ 1.9.1, 1.9.2. 
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The Group agreed to draft a Risk Assessment and 
Management Framework for Scientific Research involving Ocean 
Fertilization.  The parties agreed this would be a “work in 
progress,” and would serve as a preliminary model for a final 
framework that the governing bodies would adopt in October 
2009.155  The South African delegation suggested that the project 
not monetize any carbon offsets generated nor use such offsets for 
meeting targets of the Kyoto Protocol.156  However, the Group 
decided that such a policy matter should be considered at a 
meeting of the governing bodies.157  Finally, the delegations of 
Brazil and Argentina expressed concern about the LOHAFEX 
experiment and requested a report from the German and Indian 
sponsors on how the experiment might impact their coastal areas 
and EEZs.158 
The draft framework proposed at the meeting was designed 
to serve as a tool to assess scientific research proposals on a case-
by-case basis to determine if a proposed activity would comport 
with the London Convention or Protocol.159  This guidance would 
also help “determine whether a project is legitimate scientific 
research,” characterize the risks to the marine environment on a 
“project-specific basis,” and “collect the necessary information to 
develop a management strategy.”160  The elements of the 
assessment, which the sponsor of the proposed project would 
present to a national regulator,161 would include: (1) problem 
formulation and initial assessment that would define the 
parameters of the experiment; (2) site selection and description; 
(3) exposure assessment that would describe the movement and 
fate of the added substances; (4) an effects assessment; (5) a risk 
characterization that would estimate the likelihood for adverse 
impacts and the magnitude of those impacts; and (6) a list of risk 
management procedures.162 
 
 155. Id. § 2.11. 
 156. Id. § 2.12. 
 157. IMO REPORT, supra note 151 § 1.1. 
 158. Id. § 4. 
 159. Id. at Annex 2, § 1.2.1. 
 160. Id. §§ 1.2.2, 1.2.2.1 to .3. 
 161. See id. § 1.4. 
 162. Id. §§ 1.4.1 to1.4.6. 
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The framework further requires that the sponsor of a project 
provide evidentiary support for key assumptions and explain the 
potential impacts to countries that might be affected.163  The 
approval for projects would only be issued for defined periods of 
time and within defined areas, and sponsors would also have to 
report on the conduct of the experiment, as well as compliance 
with the conditions set forth by the Secretariat.164  Finally, the 
assessment and approval documentation would be made publicly 
available.165 
Interestingly, neither the language of the Annex Six 
Resolution nor the subsequent draft framework includes any 
reference to the language of the CBD Decision IX/16, which limits 
research to “small-scale” experiments in “coastal waters” in its 
criteria for permitted ocean fertilization research.166  Since the 
resolution and framework came after the CBD Decision and refer 
to the CBD Decision in their text, it is reasonable to conclude that 
the parties to the London Convention and Protocol considered 
and rejected these limitations. 
The omission of this language perhaps reflects the findings of 
the UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission ad 
hoc Consultative Group on Ocean Fertilization (IOC ad hoc 
group), a group of five leading scientists on ocean iron 
fertilization that was formed at the request of the Scientific 
Groups of the IMO in advance of the Resolution of the London 
Convention and Protocol.  In a statement released by the IOC ad 
hoc group in June 2008, the group sharply criticized the 
limitations imposed by the CBD decision.167  It railed against the 
“arbitrary” and “new” limitation of scientific research to “coastal 
waters” as “counterproductive” given that the most useful 
scientific experiments to date have taken place on the open 
ocean.168 
 
 163. IMO REPORT, supra note 151, §§ 1.7, 1.8. 
 164. Id. § 1.9. 
 165. Id. 
 166. See supra notes 118-123 and accompanying text. 
 167. UNESCO INTERGOVERNMENTAL OCEANOGRAPHIC COMM’N, STATEMENT OF 
THE IOC AD HOC CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON OCEAN FERTILIZATION (2008), 
http://ioc3.unesco.org/oanet/OAdocs/IOC_LCSGStatement.pdf. 
 168. Id. 
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The IOC ad hoc group statement also stressed that the size of 
the activity should not be determinative, noting that ocean iron 
fertilization projects conducted only over one square kilometer 
might be damaging if undertaken over a coral reef, while ocean 
fertilization undertaken over thousands of square kilometers 
might be benign.169  The statement further maintained that 
“small-scale” was a relative term and it expressly approved of 
larger experiments as a means to diminish the dilution of iron 
near the center of smaller experiments and obtaining better data 
relating to vertical transport of carbon dioxide.170  It endorsed 
experiments as large as 200 kilometers by 200 kilometers as 
clearly justified.171 
The IOC ad hoc group conceded that it lacked expertise in 
international law or policy, but it nevertheless offered two 
alternatives to policy makers of the London Convention and 
Protocol.172  The first called for an independent committee 
composed of scientists and representatives from the policy, legal, 
and industry sectors that would assess each proposed fertilization 
activity on the basis of the risks posed to the environment.173  This 
committee would have veto power over those projects it 
considered to fall below a clearly defined threshold of damage to 
the environment.174  The second suggestion would allow 
“legitimate scientific experiments”—those with defensible 
scientific goals and public disclosure of methods and results—to 
proceed, while delaying those activities designed to generate 
carbon credits or other monetary gain until environmental 
safeguards can be developed and enacted.175 
The IMO London Convention and Protocol Working Group on 
Ocean Fertilization (Working Group), which met in Guayaquil, 
Ecuador in May 2008, reviewed the IOC ad hoc group input and 
information from other international organizations with special 
expertise in ocean iron fertilization issues.  The Working Group 
 
 169. Id. § I.4. 
 170. Id. §§ II.A., II.B. 
 171. Id. § II.B. 
 172. Id. §§ I.6(a), (b). 
 173. UNESCO INTERGOVERNMENTAL OCEANOGRAPHIC COMM’N, STATEMENT, 
supra note 167. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. § I.6(b). 
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issued three recommendations for the scientific and legal groups: 
(1) it requested advice from the Legal Intersessional 
Correspondence Group regarding the appropriateness of the 
phrase “contrary to the aims of the Convention/Protocol;” (2) it 
requested that the London Convention and Protocol consolidate 
new information on scientific research on ocean iron fertilization 
as it becomes available and make it available for use in assessing 
proposals; and (3) it recommended that Annex 3 be used as the 
list of considerations for evaluating ocean iron fertilization 
activities.176 
There are some indications that the CBD is retreating from 
its de facto moratorium on ocean iron fertilization.  A draft CBD 
document entitled “Scientific Synthesis on the Impacts of Ocean 
Fertilization on Marine Biodiversity” noted the need for 
international oversight for all ocean iron fertilization activities.177  
In addition, it called for the adoption of an assessment framework 
to validate side effects and, surprisingly, for legitimate scientific 
research to advance the collective understanding of 
biogeochemical processes within the global oceans.178 
The London Convention and Protocol Correspondence Group 
reviewed this document and stated that the CBD draft could 
serve as a background paper for the London Convention and 
Protocol.179  However, it noted that the document does not offer an 
assessment framework for scientific research proposals involving 
ocean iron fertilization, nor does it provide the level of technical 
guidance necessary to ensure precautionary protection of the 
 
 176. UNESCO INTERGOVERNMENTAL OCEANOGRAPHIC COMM’N, REPORT ON THE 
IMO LONDON CONVENTION SCIENTIFIC GROUP MEETING ON OCEAN FERTILIZATION 
(2008), http://ioc3.unesco.org/oanet/OAdocs/INF1247-1.pdf. Annex 3 calls for the 
consideration of: (1) a description of the project, including the chemicals to be 
added, the manner and amount of the addition, along with the date, location and 
purpose; (2) the potential impacts of the activity on the marine environment; (3) 
the project’s contributions to scientific knowledge; and (4) the monitoring of the 
substance. According to this recommendation, all parties seeking to engage in 
research activities would have to submit a proposal addressing these 
considerations. Id. at Annex 3. 
 177. SECRETARIAT OF THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, SCIENTIFIC 
SYNTHESIS OF THE IMPACTS OF OCEAN FERTILIZATION ON MARINE BIODIVERSITY 10 
(2009), available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/publications/cbd-ts-45-en.pdf. 
 178. Id. 
 179. CHAIRMAN OF THE SG OCEAN FERTILIZATION CORRESPONDENCE GROUP, 
INTERIM REPORT ON OCEAN FERTILIZATION SCIENCE OVERVIEWS 3 (2009). 
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marine environment.180  The Group further noted that the CBD 
document “contained gaps” and served a different purpose—to 
compile and synthesize available scientific information on 
potential impacts on marine biodiversity—than that of the 
Correspondence Group.181 
Based on the text of the Annex Six Resolution released by the 
London Convention and Protocol, the extent to which the 
statements of the IOC ad hoc group or the Scientific Working 
Group were considered is unclear.  Nor does the resolution offer 
any indication as to the applicability of the limitations imposed 
by the CBD Decision IX/16.  However, it is clear that the London 
Convention and Protocol do not authorize sanctions for violations.  
While voluntary compliance with the London Convention and 
Protocol is reported to be high,182 it is unclear whether the 
prohibition provides sufficient deterrence for commercial 
enterprises that might engage in large-scale ocean iron 
fertilization research to test their methods in advance of expected 
future carbon trading. 
III. THE LOHAFEX PROJECT AND THE NEED FOR A 
NEW LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
If one of the goals of international environmental law is to 
provide clear guidelines so that states may regulate entities 
subject to their jurisdiction, then the LOHAFEX project provides 
an ideal illustration of the shortcomings of the current legal 
framework governing ocean iron fertilization.  This part of the 
article examines the legality of the LOHAFEX expedition under 
existing international environmental law and illustrates why a 
new legal framework is necessary. 
The LOHAFEX project fails to comply with the mandate of 
CBD Decision IX/16, which restricts ocean iron fertilization 
projects to “small-scale” studies within “coastal waters.”183 
Neither the decision, nor Article 2, of CBD defines” small-scale” 
or “coastal waters,” but the proposed site in the Southern Ocean 
does not appear to qualify as coastal waters. 
 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. HUNTER, SALZMAN & ZAELKE, supra note 106, at 819. 
 183. See supra notes 118-123 and accompanying text. 
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The risk assessment prepared by the Alfred Wegener 
Institute, the German group that co-sponsored the experiment, 
does not claim that the site falls within coastal waters.  Instead, 
the assessment states that its proposed approach complies with 
the requirements of the CBD. It first references the recent CBD 
decision, placing emphasis on the stated need for further research 
to assess the impact on the ecosystem and the efficacy of iron 
fertilization.184  It then asserts that the proposal is based on 
“intercomparisons . . . of previous iron fertilisation experiments 
all carried out in the Southern Ocean including coastal waters 
that provide the basis for the assessment of the impact of such 
experiments on the environment.”185  It later describes the 
location as “downstream from an extensive land mass” (the 
Antarctic Peninsula), which “contains waters with coastal 
plankton species.”186  With regard to the “small-scale” 
requirement, the assessment describes the spatial scale as “small 
in respect to the surrounding environment” and small “in 
comparison to natural iron enrichments by coastal waters or 
icebergs.”187 
According to the assessment, the LOHAFEX experiment: (1) 
fulfills the need to assess its impact on the ecosystem;188 (2) fits 
within the scope of the term “coastal waters” because the subject 
matter has previously been studied in coastal water and coastal 
plankton live in the water;189 and (3) satisfies the “small-scale” 
requirement if compared to the size of the Southern Ocean and 
natural iron enrichments.190  This argument is hardly an ironclad 
legal defense.  Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude, as did the 
German Environment Ministry, that the experiment would not 
comply with a strict interpretation of CBD Decision IX/16. 
In response to a letter from a non-governmental organization 
(NGO) that alleged that a violation of the CBD had occurred, the 
Bureau of the Conference of the Parties to the CBD addressed the 
 
 184. ALFRED WEGENER INST., RISK ASSESSMENT OF THE LOHAFEX EXPEDITION 
2 (2009). 
 185. Id. at 2 (emphasis added). 
 186. Id. at 3 (emphasis added). 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 4. 
 189. Id. at 5-6. 
 190. RISK ASSESSMENT OF THE LOHAFEX EXPEDITION, supra note 184. 
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issue of the LOHAFEX expedition in Nairobi, Kenya on February 
19, 2009.191  After the German representative left the room to let 
the Bureau discuss the course of action, the Executive Secretary 
noted that the issue of implementation of COP decisions was not 
addressed in the rules of procedure and that the responsibility to 
implement COP decisions lay with the parties at the national 
level.192  Nevertheless, the Bureau members felt compelled to 
issue a formal response to the NGO.193  The Bureau concluded 
that it was up to Germany to respond to the letter from the NGO.  
The Bureau also indicated that it would send a letter to Germany 
and India to convey the Bureau’s concerns about the LOHAFEX 
expedition.194 
This interaction highlights the decentralized nature of 
international law.  Instead of providing a centralized enforcement 
mechanism, the CBD (and the other treaties discussed above) 
relies on states to police the activities of nationals within their 
jurisdiction.  While the results might have disappointed the 
expectations of observers in favor of more concrete action against 
Germany in response to the LOHAFEX expedition, the CBD 
Bureau’s response demonstrates that its members shared the 
concerns that the NGO expressed regarding possible violations of 
the CBD’s restrictions on ocean iron fertilization. 
By contrast, the legal justification for the LOHAFEX 
expedition appears somewhat stronger under the London 
Convention and Protocol Resolution, whose terms do not include 
the restrictions of the CBD resolution.  The project would very 
likely meet the threshold requirement that it be a scientific 
research project.  However, the Scientific Groups under the 
London Convention and Protocol have not yet issued an 
assessment framework.  Therefore, as a party to the Convention 
and Protocol, Germany must “use utmost caution and the best 
available guidance to evaluate the . . . proposal to ensure 
“protection of the marine environment consistent with the 
 
 191. Bureau of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, Nairobi, Kenya, Feb. 13, 2009, Minutes of the Meeting of the Bureau 
of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity Held 
in Nairobi, on 13 February 2009, available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/ 
cop-bureau/cop-bur-2009/cop-bur-2009-02-13-minutes-en.pdf. 
 192. Id. at 7-8. 
 193. Id. at 8. 
 194. Id. 
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Convention and Protocol.”195  The risk assessment plausibly 
maintains that the naturally occurring iron enrichment in the 
region is much larger in scale than the level of iron to be 
deposited in the proposed experiment; therefore, it would cause 
no greater ecological damage than that presently occurring 
naturally.  Accordingly, Germany could reasonably conclude that 
this experiment fits within the scientific research exception to the 
resolution. 
As demonstrated by the foregoing analysis, these two 
overlapping treaties impose different levels of obligations for 
scientific research projects that seek to conduct ocean iron 
fertilization, with the CBD imposing several highly restrictive 
terms that are conspicuously absent in the London Convention 
and Protocol.  Yet the German Ministry of Research still allowed 
the project to move forward, despite the uncertainty regarding its 
compliance with the CBD and over the objections of the Ministry 
of the Environment.  The rationale for this decision is unclear, 
but press releases from both the Alfred Wegener Institute and the 
Indian National Institute of Oceanography used the ambiguity 
and incongruity in international legal instruments to justify the 
LOHAFEX expedition.196 
IV. FOUNDATIONS FOR A NEW LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The unclear and conflicting mandates in the existing legal 
framework governing the LOHAFEX project illustrate the need 
for a new legal framework to regulate scientific research on ocean 
iron fertilization.  First, and most importantly, the new legal 
framework would harmonize the incongruous treaty obligations 
in the existing framework to ensure that states understand 
whether actors subject to their jurisdiction are in compliance with 
international law.  Second, the framework would address ground 
rules for those parties seeking to capitalize on ocean iron 
 
 195. ANNEX SIX RESOLUTION, supra note 145, at 6. 
 196. See, e.g., INDIAN NAT’L OCEANOGRAPHY INST, SCIENTIFIC AIMS AND 
DESCRIPTION OF LOHAFEX: AN INDO-GERMAN IRON FERTILIZATION EXPERIMENT  
IN THE SOUTHERN OCEAN (2009), http://www.nio.org/projects/narvekar/Statement 
%20_on_LOHAFEX.pdf (citing the approval by London Convention and Protocol 
Annex Six Resolution of scientific research projects, while failing to mention 
restrictions on such experiments in the CBD); RISK ASSESSMENT OF THE 
LOHAFEX EXPEDITION, supra note 184. 
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fertilization through the trade of carbon credits, as well as for 
those parties that wish to engage in scientific research.  In lieu of 
an artificial distinction based on the motivation of those looking 
to explore ocean iron fertilization, the new framework would treat 
all parties equally and distinguish proposed activities on the 
basis of the scope of the project.  Third, the proposed legal 
framework would include differentiated standards for small-scale 
and large-scale ocean iron fertilization projects. 
 A. Harmonize Incongruous Treaty Obligations 
The most important element of any framework that seeks to 
regulate ocean iron fertilization is to consolidate the incongruous 
treaty obligations under UNCLOS, the CBD, and the London 
Convention and Protocol.  As noted above, UNCLOS requires that 
member states abide by the international rules and standards 
regarding pollution, including “dumping.”.197  Thus, the 
international rules and standards agreed to by parties to the CBD 
and the London Convention and Protocol could have a binding 
effect on any party to UNCLOS.  Moreover, to the extent that 
UNCLOS codifies customary international law, such rules and 
standards could arguably have a binding effect on any state 
whose flagged vessels engage in ocean iron fertilization.198 
However, the requirements of the CBD and the London 
Convention and Protocol need better coordination.199  This 
 
 197. UNCLOS, supra note 20, arts. 194, 210. 
 198. See generally Bradford C. Mank, Can Plaintiffs Use Multinational 
Environmental Treaties as Customary International Law to Sue Under the 
Alien Tort Statute?, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 1085 (2007). 
 199. Other treaties have successfully entered into cooperative arrangements 
in the Southern Ocean to regulate the behavior of non-state actors. For example, 
parties to Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild 
Fauna and Flora (CITES) and the Commission of the Convention on the 
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) passed a 
resolution regarding cooperation in trade in toothfish that encouraged a 
“permanent flow of information.” Resolution 12.4, Cooperation Between CITES 
and the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 
Regarding Trade in Toothfish, CITES Doc. Conf. 12.4 (2002). In addition, the 
two treaties have extended observer status to one another at their respective 
meetings.  Report of the Twenty-First Meeting. For an overview on cooperation 
between the two treaties on the prevention of overfishing Patagonian Toothfish, 
see generally Laura Little & Marcos A. Orellana, Can CITES Play a Role in 
Solving the Problem of IUU Fishing?:  The Trouble with Patagonian Toothfish, 
16 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 21 (2005). In the context of ocean iron 
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regulatory gap requires an independent body comprised of 
delegates from the treaties discussed here and any relevant 
regional treaties, along with scientific analysts who could provide 
relevant guidance for any actions.  The organization should also 
obtain input from those entities seeking to engage in commercial 
ocean iron fertilization whose interests would be regulated by this 
body.  This body should implement regulations that put 
interested parties, and the states that must govern their actions, 
on notice of what is required in order to be in compliance with 
international law. 
The international regime best equipped to house such a body 
is the IMO, a specialized agency within the United Nations 
primarily tasked with developing and maintaining a 
comprehensive regulatory framework for maritime shipping.200  
The IMO already oversees a number of international treaties, 
including the London Convention and Protocol.201  With 169 
Member States and three Associate Members, the IMO has the 
authority necessary to implement such regulations.202 
The IMO should implement regulations that allow for 
interested parties to apply for permits to conduct ocean iron 
fertilization experiments.  Applicants for these permits should be 
segregated into two classes: (1) those seeking to engage in large-
scale activities, and (2) those seeking to conduct small-scale 
research activities.  This distinction was already recognized in 
 
fertilization, such inter-treaty cooperation has similarly begun to coalesce. For 
example, in May 2009, the Scientific Groups of the London Convention and 
Protocol established a Correspondence Group on Ocean Fertilization to collate 
the views of contracting parties on this issue and identify disparities in these 
views. This group consisted of a number of countries, the CBD Secretariat, the 
UNESCO-IOC Secretariat, Advisory Committee on Protection of the Sea, 
Greenpeace International, and International Emissions Trading Association. 
 200. IMO, The Origins of the International Maritime Organization, 
http://www.imo.org/home.asp?topic_id=1726 (last visited Apr. 16, 2010). See 
generally Alexandra Ritucci-Chinni, The Solution to International Cruise Ship 
Pollution:  How Harmonizing the International Legal Regime Can Help Save 
the Seas, 7 DARTMOUTH L.J. 27 (2009) (arguing that the IMO could serve as an 
implementing agency for enhanced integration of UNCLOS and MARPOL 
mandates to address international cruise ship pollution). 
 201. London Protocol, supra note 22, art. 1.2. For an extensive list of treaties 
implemented by IMO, see IMO, International Maritime Organization Complete 
List, http://www.imo.org/home.asp?topic_id=1726 (last visited Apr. 16, 2010). 
 202. IMO, Membership, http://www.imo.org (last visited Apr. 16, 2010) (scroll 
down to “Member States”). 
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the CBD Decision and the London Convention and Protocol 
Resolution. 
Contrary to the statement of the IOC ad hoc group, the 
distinction between large-scale projects and small-scale projects 
is valid and important in considering the regulation of ocean iron 
fertilization projects.  While the ad hoc group’s suggestion that a 
small algae bloom over a reef could cause more damage than a far 
larger bloom on the open ocean is true, this concern is misplaced.  
No scientist has yet proposed to engage in ocean iron fertilization 
over reefs, and there is consensus that these activities are best 
undertaken in the iron-deficient expanse of the Southern Ocean.  
Moreover, any activity that would threaten a reef would 
presumably take place in coastal waters and be subject to the 
regulations of the state whose territorial seas are threatened. 
The IOC ad hoc group suggests, instead, that the line should 
be drawn between those activities that harm the environment 
and those that do not.  However, this uncontroversial proposition 
does not exclude distinctions based on the size of the project.  
Indeed, any regulation has to distinguish between the proposed 
spatial scope of the project, as well as the proposed amount of 
iron to be added, because these factors are likely to be the best 
indicators of the environmental damage that might occur.  
Therefore, the distinction between large-scale and small-scale 
projects should be preserved. 
However, contrary to the CBD Decision and the Annex Six 
Resolution of the London Convention and Protocol, the distinction 
between commercial and scientific activities is artificial and 
unnecessary.  Those parties that seek to profit from ocean iron 
fertilization have the same capacity to conduct meaningful 
scientific experiments as any other group.  In fact, commercial 
companies often have access to greater resources that might allow 
them to conduct longer-term experiments and advance the body 
of knowledge surrounding ocean iron fertilization.  In addition, 
scientific institutions could cause harm to the environment when 
conducting reckless experiments in the same manner as profit-
driven enterprises could.  Therefore, parties that seek to profit 
should have the same right to apply for a permit as any other 
research institution, provided that they adhere to the same 
restrictions that govern the scientific institutions. 
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 B. Capitalize on Cap and Trade 
While most commentary on ocean iron fertilization projects 
vigorously contests the wisdom of allowing such projects for 
commercial purposes, there are some legitimate reasons, noted 
above, for allowing these projects to move forward.  To 
understand how these commercial projects could be implemented, 
however, it is essential to evaluate the international legal 
mechanisms pursuant to which commercial enterprises seek to 
profit through the sale of carbon credits. 
States can use carbon credits to meet their greenhouse gas 
emission reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol, provided 
that such credits meet the requirements of the Kyoto Protocol and 
the UNFCCC.203  While the UNFCCC envisions the use of all 
types of sequestration techniques, the terms of the Kyoto Protocol 
do not allow for the use of carbon sinks; strict rules prohibit the 
use of carbon sinks to generate carbon credits, with the exception 
of afforestation or reforestation projects.204  The European 
Emission Trading Scheme does not accept any sink projects at 
all.205 
The Kyoto Protocol does, however, authorize the use of 
“flexibility mechanisms” to meet emission reduction goals.  One of 
these mechanisms—Joint Implementation—allows two developed 
countries to collaborate in a project to reduce emissions in one 
country, with investment from the other that can then claim 
carbon credits for achieved emission reductions.206 
The Kyoto Protocol also includes the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM), which allows developed countries to invest in 
emission reduction projects in developing countries and claim 
carbon credits for achieved emission reductions.207  Participation 
in these projects is open to both public and private actors, 
provided that they act under the authority of a party to the Kyoto 
Protocol and act pursuant to the guidance of the CDM Executive 
Board.208  While the Conference of the Parties in Bali decided in 
 
 203. Freestone & Rayfuse, supra note 105, at 228. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
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2007 that it would consider expanding the list of allowable carbon 
sinks beyond reforestation and afforestation to include avoided 
deforestation,209 ocean iron fertilization has not gained sufficient 
legitimacy to allow for its eligibility as a carbon sink under the 
CDM anytime in the near future. 
Nevertheless, the uncertainty in the existing legal 
mechanisms has not prevented companies from positioning 
themselves to capitalize on this potential market.  Companies 
such as Ocean Nourishment and Climos, among others, have 
already invested in technology that might one day be used 
pursuant to the Kyoto Protocol and its post-2012 successor 
agreement.  The parties to the Kyoto Protocol met in Copenhagen 
in December 2009 in the much-anticipated Fifteenth Conference 
of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol.  The meeting fell short of 
expectations and only produced a non-binding agreement, the 
Copenhagen Accord.210 
There is room for optimism, however, regarding the future of 
ocean iron fertilization as a mitigation strategy because the 
Copenhagen Accord included several provisions addressing 
reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD).  
For example, Article 6 recognizes the crucial role of REDD to 
“enable the mobilization of financial resources from developed 
countries” to reduce global GHG emissions.211  REDD embraces 
the notion that paying developing countries to preserve tropical 
forests’ capacity to absorb carbon from the atmosphere is an 
extremely potent regulatory tool.  The Copenhagen Accord lays a 
foundation for REDD to be an integral component of post-Kyoto 
climate treaty.  Such a focus on the importance of sinks in climate 
change mitigation could open the door for ocean iron fertilization 
 
 209. Freestone & Rayfuse, supra note 105, at 231. 
 210. Conference of the Parties, Fifteenth Session, Copenhagen, Denmark, Dec. 
7-18, 2009, Draft Decision: Proposal by the President, Copenhagen Accord, U.N. 
Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/L.7 (Dec. 18, 2009), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/ 
docs/2009/cop15/eng/l07.pdf. 
 211. Id. art. 6. For a critique of the adequacy of the REDD language in the 
Copenhagen Accord, see Chris Lang, What Came out of Copenhagen on REDD?, 
REDD-MONITOR, Dec. 22, 2009, http://www.redd-monitor.org/2009/12/22/what-
came-out-of-copenhagen-on-redd/;  see also REDD May Yet Survive Copenhagen 
Failures, CARBON POSITIVE, Dec. 21, 2009, http://www.carbonpositive.net/view 
article.aspx?articleID=1786. 
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to be added as an acceptable component of climate change 
mitigation in a post-Kyoto regime. 
Moving forward from Copenhagen and its acceptance of 
REDD, the regulatory framework for ocean iron fertilization 
should be expanded to allow for pilot projects for more radical 
carbon sinks such as ocean iron fertilization, provided that the 
companies are subject to rigorous permitting requirements even 
stricter than those that would govern REDD projects.  This 
approach could help spur innovation and expand the funding 
available to scientific researchers who have expressed the need to 
study ocean iron fertilization on a longer-term basis and on a 
larger scale.212  However, these private actors should have to 
comply with the requirements of a two-tiered permitting scheme 
that accommodates small-scale and large-scale projects. 
 C.   Identify Requirements for Small-Scale and Large-
Scale Projects 
To promote environmentally sensitive implementation of 
ocean iron fertilization projects, both small-scale and large-scale 
projects should be subject to strict requirements.  One such 
requirement is government sponsorship, which would increase 
accountability for any experiment as states are unlikely to 
sponsor an environmentally reckless endeavor that might damage 
their reputation in the international community.  Applicants 
should also have to share any meaningful scientific data with the 
community through the publication of peer-reviewed reports upon 
completion of the experiment.  While proprietary techniques and 
trade secrets could possibly be afforded some protection, the 
underlying methodology would have to be subject to examination. 
In addition, the number of permits to conduct small-scale 
activities would need to be capped at a number to reflect the 
understanding of the scientific community as to the carrying 
capacity of the oceans.  This requirement would ensure that the 
permitting body consider the experiments in the aggregate, and 
not engage in piecemeal destruction of the marine environment.  
Finally, applicants should be required to prepare extensive risk 
assessments, similar to the impact assessments required under 
 
 212. See Smetacek & Naqvi, supra note 27. 
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the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),213 which would 
address, at a minimum, the risks inherent in the experiment, the 
hypothesis to be tested, and the contribution to scientific 
understanding that the experiment seeks to make.  This 
requirement would force both the applicant and the state sponsor 
to fully consider the potential environmental impacts of its 
decisions and enhance the overall understanding of the process of 
ocean iron fertilization.  This list of requirements for small-scale 
applicants is suggestive, not exhaustive, of the types of 
restrictions that might limit the environmental impact of any 
applicant, commercial or public, that seeks to engage in ocean 
iron fertilization activities. 
The foregoing restrictions would apply to both large-scale and 
small-scale applications.  However, large-scale ocean iron 
fertilization proposals would be subject to greater scrutiny.  These 
experiments would be subject to enhanced oversight, and the 
adverse consequences of such experiments would potentially 
trigger liability under certain circumstances. 
As with small-scale experiments, applicants for large-scale 
projects would have to prepare environmental risk statements 
outlining the potential damage that their activities would pose.  
The regulatory body responsible for processing the permit 
applications would have to exercise a greater degree of scrutiny 
with these applications because the stakes presumably would be 
higher.  In addition, as these large-scale projects would allow for 
greater potential to test the commercial viability of an enterprise 
and demonstrate greater ability to sequester carbon, the permits 
for these activities would likely be worth more to the applicants.  
Accordingly, these permits should be auctioned to allow the 
market to determine their worth. 
These large-scale experiments would also be subject to a 
greater degree of oversight.  As the number of experiments would 
be extremely limited, it might be possible for independent 
observers to travel with the research team to verify that the 
experiment is conducted properly.  This requirement would have 
the additional benefit of allowing the independent observers to 
verify the findings of the research team and discourage any 
exaggeration by commercial enterprises as to the effectiveness of 
 
 213. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f (2006). 
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their methods.  If the body finds that independent observers 
would not be a feasible way to monitor these projects, an 
alternative would be to monitor the activities using satellite 
imaging.  This technology exists and algae blooms have already 
been observed via satellite.214  Thus, the technology would simply 
be applied to the research activity in question. 
Finally, these large-scale experiments should be subject to a 
greater degree of liability for any consequences that might arise.  
For example, if an algae bloom from a large-scale project creates a 
toxic bloom or low-oxygen environments that produce cognizable 
damage to the territorial seas of a state, then the permit terms 
would require assessment of the damages.  This assigning of 
responsibility would be governed by the strict liability 
standard.215  Such an approach is reasonable because the risk 
assessment creates a presumption that the actor has the intent to 
cause the damages that flow from his actions.  In addition, this 
activity is an abnormally dangerous activity and thus merits the 
application of strict liability.216  This approach would not, 
however, require the actor to compensate the party harmed for 
every fish taken, as this would require prohibitively expensive 
environmental analysis.  Instead, it would require some form of 
simplified damage assessment that would use a formula based on 
degree of harm produced (the type of damage) multiplied by the 
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number of square kilometers affected.  This formula would yield a 
dollar amount that represents the damages incurred by the party. 
In addition, UNCLOS contains a dispute resolution 
mechanism217 that allows parties to refer disputes to the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the International 
Court of Justice, or another ad-hoc arbitral tribunal.218  Thus, any 
party harmed by an ocean iron fertilization project may bring suit 
under this provision, which would promote further disincentives 
for reckless behavior and a remedy for parties harmed by 
permitted ocean iron fertilization projects. 
CONCLUSION 
Ocean iron fertilization is a flashpoint of controversy as well 
as a source of hope in confronting the challenges posed by global 
climate change.  Although disagreement continues over whether 
ocean iron fertilization is a safe and effective strategy to absorb 
carbon, the more significant controversy centers on what form a 
fair, cohesive, and environmentally sensitive international legal 
regime to govern these undertakings should take, regardless of 
whether such undertakings are conducted to advance scientific 
research or profit-driven motives.  The unclear and conflicting 
mandates in the existing legal framework governing the 
LOHAFEX project underscore the need for a new legal framework 
to regulate scientific research on ocean iron fertilization. 
This article has proposed a legal framework to address this 
regulatory gap that would harmonize the overlapping and 
conflicting regulatory mandates of UNCLOS, the CBD, and the 
London Convention and Protocol in the context of ocean iron 
fertilization.  The framework would seek to reward proactive 
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innovation within a broader context of promoting short-term and 
long-term accountability for the effects of this experimental 
strategy on the integrity of the marine environment and the 
global environment as a whole.  The IMO would be the lead 
agency to coordinate and monitor this revised framework. The 
proposal also would enable parties to capitalize on ocean iron 
fertilization through the trade of carbon credits in the post-Kyoto 
era given the Copenhagen Accord’s acceptance of the importance 
of the role of carbon sinks in climate change mitigation.  The new 
framework would treat all parties equally and distinguish 
proposed activities on the basis of the scope of the project.  
Finally, the proposed legal framework also would include 
differentiated standards for small-scale and large-scale ocean iron 
fertilization projects. 
While the proposed framework would provide some 
foundational principles, any regulatory structure that governs 
ocean iron fertilization should remain flexible.  Technological 
improvements in ocean iron fertilization tactics could lead to 
improved efficacy of this technique as a carbon sink, or, 
alternatively, a consensus may emerge in the scientific 
community in the near future that such a radical technique has 
no place as a climate change mitigation strategy.  However, as 
the dire consequences of climate change become ever more real, 
policy makers need to retain a broad range of options.  Most 
scientists agree that ocean iron fertilization withdrew massive 
amounts of carbon dioxide in prior periods of climate fluctuation.  
Therefore, the international community should strive to learn as 
much as possible about this rapidly deployable mitigation 
technique that offers tremendous promise as a potent weapon in 
the fight against climate change. 
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